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Professor Baron uses a linguistic approach in her paper, examining the
meaning, or various meanings, of "to justify."1 Professor Baron also tells us which
meaning she prefers for which reasons.
I believe the linguistic approach is inappropriate for addressing the issues the
juxtaposition "justification or excuse" poses today. A glance at the Oxford English
Dictionary reveals that the word "to justify" is derived from the Latin 'justificare,"
meaning "justum facere"-"to make just." The OED also notes that the word is
"Christian Latin." Reading that strengthened my long-held suspicion that we have
the word "to justify" from the Apostle Paul's justification doctrine, or more
precisely from its Latin translation. Words like 'justificare" and 'justificatio"
were later transported from the language of theology to the language of moral
philosophy. I am not exactly sure when that happened, but I think Luis de Molina,
who lived in the sixteenth century, is responsible. At any rate, it seems certain that
the word was imported into the language of moral philosophy during the Spanish
late Scholastic period. Grotius later used the expression "causa justifica"--
'justifying cause."2  Following Grotius, the natural law theorists of the
Enlightenment spoke of ']ustificare," and so it was that the expressions entered the
language of criminal law theory.
Molina certainly intended to express something sensible when he used the
words ']ustificare" and 'Justificatio." Still we need to ask whether transporting
theological expressions also imported fully unnecessary problems into moral
theory-problems we now have merely because we use these words. I would like
to avoid these problems to the extent possible, and would thus like to take a
different approach from Professor Baron's. I shall call mine a "systematic
approach," meaning that I intend first to describe the problems we indeed do have
before I would agree to any linguistic analysis. The substantive issues that need to
be resolved cannot be resolved by the linguistic approach.
I. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE PERSPECTIVES
In this analysis, I am proceeding from a system of rules that includes only
norms of prohibition and norms of permission. Consequently, I will not deal with
norms of requirement and their exceptions. Essentially Professor Baron does the
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same. I would first like to differentiate between the prospective and the
retrospective, and shall begin with the prospective.
3
In the prospective, a very clear relationship exists between norms of
prohibition and norms of permission. This relationship is defined by saying that
the propositions "a is prohibited" and "a is permitted" are contradictories. It is in
this sense that the word "permissum" is used as early as in Accursius' Glossa
Ordinaria.4  Kant 5 and other eighteenth century authors were aware of this
meaning, and twentieth century authors, such as Kalinowski,6 used this meaning as
well in their work on deontic logic. The contradictory nature of "a is prohibited"
and "a is permitted" indicates that norms of prohibition and norms of permission
are located on the same logical level within any single normative system. The
relationship between these two norms, therefore, can be understood as the
relationship between rules and exceptions to those rules. Prohibitions provide the
rules, and permissions provide the exceptions.
I would also like to distinguish between two types of judgments, namely
descriptive and normative judgments. Descriptive judgments report the relevant
facts; normative judgments subsume these facts under the relevant norms. To use
R.M. Hare's example, "The strawberries are red, juicy, and sweet" is a descriptive
judgment, and "The strawberries are good" is a normative judgment.7
The distinction between descriptive and normative judgments permits us to
draw a distinction between the definitional and evaluative parts of a norm. The
definitional part of a norm describes the category of relevant acts. The evaluative
part contains the determination of whether the act is prohibited or is permitted.
I would further like to distinguish between two levels, namely the ought level
and the can level. First as to the ought level. The application of norms of
prohibition and norms of permission in concrete situations leads to statements such
as "You ought not to do [a specific act] a!" or "You may do [a specific act] a!"
These statements should not be confused with the norms of prohibition and norms
of permission themselves, which at first blush seem so similar, but which are
formulated abstractly: "Killing is prohibited" ("Thou shalt not kill!"). The ought
level, on the other hand, is concerned with the application of these norms in
concrete situations, such as the situation in which A is about to shoot B and I call
to him: "You ought not to kill-don't do it!"
The ought level and the can level are connected through the old saw
"Impossibilium nulla obligatio!" ("As to the impossible there is no obligation!"). 8
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Rephrased: "'ought' implies 'can'." That is an assumption any speaker makes
when he uses propositions on the ought level in the lingua recta. One who says
"Close the door!" assumes and implies in the lingua recta that the addressee of this
imperative has the ability to close the door. It is not only "ought," however, but
also "may" which implies "can." As is true of old saws, they are often imprecise
or incomplete.
The old saw "Impossibilium nulla obligatio!" is imprecise and incomplete in
another respect as well. Celsus should at least have said "Impossibilium et
necessariorum nulla obligatio!" "Ought" and "may" not only imply "can" but also
imply that the action in question is not a matter of natural necessity. In other
words, the prospective application of a system of rules from the viewpoint of the
person applying those rules implies the contingency of the (future) commission or
omission of an action to which the system of rules is being applied.
Finally, I distinguish between the objective observer (in the first instance that
is I myself) and the person who is about to commit or omit a certain action.
Distinguishing between the objective observer and the agent permits me to
compare the observer's judgments to the agent's. If the judgments do not
correspond, we speak of the agent's "mistake." The agent can err in his descriptive
or in his normative judgments. Assume that A is about to shoot B. I can then say:
"That is a human being at which A is shooting," whereas A thinks: "That is a tree
at which I am shooting." In this case A errs as to the relevant circumstances
surrounding the act, meaning in his descriptive judgment. In contrast, A could
recognize the relevant circumstances but still make a relevant mistake. I say: "A
may not shoot B!" whereas A thinks: "I may shoot!" A then errs on the normative
judgment level. The objective observer never errs. Instead, his judgments provide
the standard for determining whether the agent judges correctly or mistakenly. If
you say that I am mistaken, then you place yourself on the level of the objective
observer in my stead.
Length restrictions have required me to say quite a bit in very few words. I
would like to use even fewer words to capture the retrospective. In the
retrospective, the offense definitions combined with the evaluation that the act is
"unlawful" correspond to the prospective norms of prohibition. Hence the
statement: "One who killed another human being has acted unlawfully!"
corresponds to the prohibition against killing ("Thou shalt not kill!"). At home, I
would call the retrospective norms that correspond to the norms of permission
"justificatory norms." Here I shall call them "norms of exception." In the
retrospective, norms of exception correspond to the definitions of exceptions
combined with the evaluation that the act is "not unlawful." Accordingly, the
norm of exception: "One who injured another human being in a self-defense
situation when the injury was necessary to ward off an attack did not act
unlawfully!" corresponds to the norm of permission, "In a self-defense situation,
you may injure the assailant if necessary to ward off the attack!"
Two levels must be distinguished in the retrospective as well. In the
retrospective, the application of the offense definitions and the exceptions
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combined with the evaluation "did (or did not) act unlawfully!" corresponds to the
ought level in the prospective. Retrospectively applying these norms to an act
implies that the act has been imputed to the actor. Imputing the act means inter
alia that the agent acted "freely." Assuming that an act was free is merely the
retrospective equivalent of assuming in the prospective that "ought" and "may"
imply the contingency of the required or permitted act.
II. MISTAKES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE
In light of these preparatory comments, I would now like to discuss two cases
that Professor Baron also discusses. The first case is easy.
A shoots B in a self-defense situation. Killing the assailant was
necessary to save A's life. A is aware of all the relevant circumstances
surrounding his act.
In solving this case I am assuming a system of norms which, on the one hand,
prohibits homicide and, on the other, permits homicide as an exception in self-
defense situations. I call this system of rules "law."
A did not act unlawfully, either from the objective observer's viewpoint or
from A's own viewpoint. Admittedly, A did fulfill the offense definition that
corresponds to the prohibition against homicide, and that initially indicates that
A's act is unlawful. Nonetheless, the definition of an exception that corresponds to
the permission to kill if necessary in self-defense is applicable as well. That is the
reason why A did not act unlawfully. The killing of an assailant might be
unfortunate, but it is as unlawful as the killing of a fly.
This case is a case in which the agent's judgment corresponds to the objective
observer's judgment regarding the relevant circumstances surrounding the act.
The next case is a case in which the two judgments do not correspond.
C injures D because C thinks D is attacking him, which, from the
objective observer's viewpoint, is false. If the situation were as C
believes it is, his act would be within the limits of lawful self-defense.
Accordingly, C falsely assumes that circumstances exist which would
fulfill the requirements of a definition of an exception.
The solution to this case appears at first impression to be the following: From
the objective observer's viewpoint, the act and situation are such that the observer
must judge the act to be prohibited (unlawful), meaning that circumstances exist
which fulfill an offense definition (definition of prohibition), and it is not the case
that circumstances exist that fulfill the definition of any exception. In contrast,
from the agent's viewpoint it is not the case that the act and the situation are such
that the act is to be judged as prohibited. To be sure, the agent does recognize that
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circumstances exist which fulfill the definition of a prohibition, but he falsely
assumes that circumstances also exist which fulfill the definition of an exception.
Here the issue is raised whether the agent's perceptions are relevant at all, and
if they are, why that is so. It may seem obvious that they are relevant, but it is far
from self-evident. The question is also not easy to answer. Our case is one of a
system of cases that we need to view as a whole before we can attain consistent
solutions. In particular, we need to examine four types of mistake cases.
1. The cases in which the actor does not recognize that circumstances
exist which are relevant under an offense definition. Example:
Driver D does not realize that he is about to hit a pedestrian and
injure him.
2. The cases in which the actor falsely assumes that circumstances
exist which are relevant under an offense definition. Example: E
shoots at a tree and thinks he is shooting at a human being.
3. The cases in which the actor falsely assumes that circumstances
exist which are relevant under the definition of an exception to a
prohibition. Example: F falsely assumes he is being attacked with
deadly force and shoots the assailant, which is the only means
available to ward off the assumed attack.
4. The cases in which the actor does not recognize that circumstances
exist which are relevant under the definition of an exception to a
prohibition. Example: G kills V out of revenge, but, unbeknownst
to G, V was about to kill him, and would have, had G not killed V.
The question arises for the first case group whether D's unknowing injury of
the pedestrian is less wrong than the knowing injury, or alternatively not wrong at
all. If we answer this question in the affirmative, then we emphasize, in addition to
the objective, the subjective aspect of the act. That is precisely what we do in the
Western world. Ever since Aristotle required that an actor know the relevant
circumstances in order to assume his act was free,9 we have declared that the
subjective aspect of the act is relevant. Consequently, in the first case group, the
unknowing injury of another human being is less wrong than the knowing injury,
or perhaps not wrong at all.
This determination has an effect on the cases in the second case group.
Aristotle's commentator Aquinas once wrote: "Eiusdem est ligare et solvere."
("Binding and releasing are two sides of the same coin").1° Accordingly, if not
knowing the circumstances surrounding an act that are relevant under an offense
definition works to the actor's benefit, then falsely assuming such circumstances
9 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 111.3; 111.1 (Sarah Broadie & Christopher Rowe eds. &
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
10 THOMAS AQUINAS, DE VERITATE, q. 17, a. 3, o.4 (Raymundi Spiazzi ed., 1964).
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must work to his detriment. That is the reason why we would convict E of a
(completed) attempt to commit the act that he believed himself to be committing.
Having made it this far in the analysis, we can see the solution to the cases in
the third and fourth case groups easily. Because the definitions of the exceptions
are on the same logical level as the offense definitions, mistakes regarding the
circumstances that are relevant under a definition of an exception must be treated
in the same way as mistakes regarding circumstances that are relevant under a
definition of an offense.
I shall not discuss the problems raised by the fourth case group, but instead
will concentrate on the third group of cases in which the agent falsely assumes the
existence of circumstances that are relevant under a definition of an exception.
Since we must treat these cases in the same way as we treat the cases in which the
actor lacked knowledge of circumstances relevant under an offense definition, then
we must say at least initially that the act cannot be imputed to the actor as a free
act. Initially not imputing the act to the actor as his free act does not exclude
imputing it to him in a second step of the analysis. We impute it to him as a free
act in a second step of the analysis if we are of the opinion that the actor was
responsible for his mistake. The actor is responsible for his mistake if we could
have expected him to avoid the mistake and he failed our expectations. If the actor
was responsible for his mistake, we say that his act was negligent, just as we say
that an act was negligent when the actor did not recognize the circumstances
relevant under an offense definition and was responsible for making the mistake.
With that as background, it appears that Professor Baron would like to say an
actor is "justified" in two very different groups of cases: 1) in the case in which the
actor recognizes all of the relevant circumstances and acts in a real situation of
self-defense, and 2) in the case in which the actor falsely assumes that
circumstances exist which would make his act an act of self-defense and was not
responsible for making this mistake. At least that is my explanation of what
"reasonable" is supposed to mean. I take it that the actor "reasonably" assumes
that circumstances exist which fulfill the definition of an exception when it is not
the case that he is responsible for his mistake.
I think I understand why the actor is supposed to be "justified" in both cases.
According to Ulpian, justice is the constant and lasting will to honor everyone's
rights." Justice is thus a characteristic of the subject. An actor can be just and
remain just even if he sometimes acts in violation of the system of conduct rules.
Aristotle said the same. Not only in the real cases of self-defense, but also in the
mistake cases, assuming that the actor was not responsible for the mistake, the
actor is and remains a just person. In the situation in which he (subjectively) finds
himself, he is in this sense "justified."
Although I think I understand why Professor Baron argues as she does, that
does not mean I can agree with her. The problem is that her analysis does not help
us any further. It merely shows us how unfortunate it was that Molina introduced
11 ULPIAN,D.I.I.10.
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the word 'justificare" into moral theory. This unfortunate occurrence causes us
unnecessary problems.
At debate in criminal law and moral theory under the rubric "justifications
and excuses" is the distinction between conduct rules and rules of imputation.
Conduct rules (the prospective norms of prohibition and norms of exception, and
their retrospective correspondents) relate to the ought level. The rules of
imputation are supposed to have a distinct purpose. In the retrospective they
correspond to the can level in the prospective. The system of rules of imputation is
complicated. I would only like to mention in passing that two levels of imputation
must be distinguished, and that I would use the expression "excuses" for those
rules that exclude imputation on the second level.
12
When we use the word "justification" in a technical sense, we refer to norms
of exception within the system of conduct rules seen in the retrospective.
Professor Baron does not use "justification" in this technical sense. Still that does
not mean we cannot continue to use the expression "justification" in this way. In
criminal law we do not speak of justice as a characteristic of a person. Instead we
are concerned with whether an act was unlawful or not. Justifications play a key
role in that determination.
12 For further discussion, see Joachim Hruschka, Imputation, 1986 BYU L. REv. 669.
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